NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 22 | Issue 1

Article 15

3-1-2018

The Case for a Federal Regulatory Sandbox for
Fintech Companies
Luke G. Thomas

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Luke G. Thomas, The Case for a Federal Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech Companies, 22 N.C. Banking Inst. 257 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol22/iss1/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

The Case for a Federal Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech
Companies
I. INTRODUCTION
“We cannot solve a problem by using the same kind of
thinking we used when we created [it].”1 Albert Einstein
Approximately 65% of Americans use at least one website or
mobile application to manage their financial lives. 2 Many of these
financial products and services are created by financial technology
(“fintech”) companies. 3 Fintech companies, like Credit Karma 4 and
PayPal,5 are businesses that leverage innovation and technology to
develop improved financial services for businesses and consumers in the
marketplace. 6 Currently, there are over 4,000 fintech companies
operating in the United States and United Kingdom alone. 7 Furthermore,
investment in fintech companies has grown to over $24 billion
worldwide. 8

1. David Mielach, 5 Business Tips from Albert Einstein, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY (Apr.
18, 2012, 12:36 PM), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2381-albert-einstein-businesstips.html.
2. See Prosper Marketplace Financial Wellness Survey, PROSPER MARKETPLACE, INC. 5
(Feb. 2016), https://www.prosper.com/about-us/wp-content/uploads/FinancialWellnessSurv
eyv5-1.pdf (conducting a survey to determine, among other things, the American use of
technology in personal finance).
3. See Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/The-Fintech-PowerGrab.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 (discussing the broad definition of a fintech company and the
various roles within the financial services marketplace these companies occupy).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Regarding Special Purpose
National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies at the Georgetown University Law Center 1
(Dec. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Thomas J. Curry, Georgetown Law Remarks], https://www
.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2016/pub-speech-2016-152.pdf.
8. Id.
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The United Kingdom, Australia,9 and other countries around the
world have begun to implement a novel regulatory concept called the
“regulatory sandbox” to enable fintech companies to innovate and test
products, services, and business models without having to worry about
certain regulatory constraints and liabilities. 10 The sandboxes have been
implemented to both spur innovation and attract prospective fintech
companies to their favorable regulatory environments.11 The United
States, however, has declined to follow suit. 12
Due to the current regulatory landscape in the United States,
fintech companies are often faced with ambiguity and confusion as to
which laws, regulations, and agencies govern their products and
services. 13 In an effort to ease this regulatory burden on fintech
companies, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)
announced its plans to create a special purpose national bank charter for
Fintech Companies (“Fintech Charter”). 14 Obtaining a Fintech Charter
from the OCC essentially places a fintech company under the same

9. Regulatory Sandbox, AUSTL. SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, http://
asic.gov.au/for-business/your-business/innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox/ (last updated
June 14, 2017) (providing an in-depth view of Australia’s regulatory initiative).
10. Stephanie Forshee, Barriers Remain to Letting US Fintechs Play in the Regulatory
‘Sandbox,’ INSIDE COUNSEL, http://www.insidecounsel.com/2017/06/01/barriers-remain-toletting-us-fintechs-play-in-the (June 1, 2017, 12:10 PM).
11. See Mike Faden, Regulatory Sandboxes Provide “Safe Spaces” for Fintech Payment
Services Innovation, AM. EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/content/foreignexchange/articles/regulatory-sandboxes-for-innovative-payment-solutions/ (last accessed
Feb. 10, 2018) (stating the major countries and nations that have already implemented a
regulatory sandbox and the purposes of a regulatory sandbox).
12. See e.g., The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong.
(2016) (providing information on The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, which
would have created a federal regulatory sandbox in the United States); Paul Sweeney, Fintech
Sandbox? States, OCC Mull Regulatory Options, DEBANKED (May 2, 2017), http://
debanked.com/2017/05/fintech-sandbox-states-occ-mull-regulatory-options/
(providing
information on state discussions regarding the creation of a “New England Regulatory Fintech
Sandbox”); see Forshee, supra note 10 (discussing barriers that remain to creation of a
regulatory sandbox in the United States).
13. See Nicholas Elliott, Where Fin-Tech is Struggling with Regulation, WALL ST. J.,
https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/24/where-fin-tech-is-struggling-withregulation/ (Nov. 24, 2015, 1:28 PM) (analyzing the major areas of concern amongst fintech
companies in the United States).
14. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL P URPOSE
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 2 (Dec. 2016), https://www.occ.treas.
gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-forfintech.pdf.
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regulatory framework as any other national bank, thus reducing the
regulatory ambiguity commonly faced by fintech companies. 15
Currently, the OCC is facing pushback from state regulators,
consumer protection groups, and community banks, all of whom argue
that the OCC lacks the legal authority to establish a Fintech Charter. 16
Other opponents suggest that the Fintech Charters offered by the OCC
would provide a legitimate option for only the largest fintech companies,
due to uncertainty as to capital and other requirements for a Fintech
Charter.17 Therefore, only a true regulatory sandbox could benefit fintech
companies of all sizes, especially those that lack either the capital and
expertise to seek a Fintech Charter from the OCC or the ability to navigate
the United States’ complex regulatory landscape with proficiency. 18
This Note discusses the history, value, and function of the
regulatory sandbox concept, as well as the current status of implementing
a regulatory sandbox in the United States. Part II chronicles the history
of the regulatory sandbox and provides a brief introduction to the
categories of fintech companies that stand to benefit from the
implementation of a regulatory sandbox.19 Part III discusses the United
States’ attempts to implement federal and state regulatory sandboxes,
compares the proposed federal sandbox with the United Kingdom’s
current sandbox model, and addresses the benefits and drawbacks of
creating a fintech sandbox as compared to the OCC’s proposed Fintech
Charter.20 Finally, Part IV concludes by reiterating the importance of
adopting a regulatory sandbox in the United States, both to reduce
regulatory ambiguity and encourage fintech companies to operate and
innovate within the United States. 21

15. Id.
16. Lalita Clozel, State Regulators Sue OCC over Fintech Charter, AM. BANKER, Apr.

26, 2017, at 1–3.
17. See Gregory Roberts, OCC Fintech Charter May Be a Poor Fit for Fintechs, BNA
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.bna.com/occ-fintech-charter-n57982083191/ (arguing that the
OCC’s Fintech Charter would only benefit the largest fintechs and would not affect the
business operations of smaller fintechs).
18. See Mark Brnovich, Regulatory Sandboxes Can Help States Advance Fintech, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 5, 2017, at 1–5 (discussing the challenges to fintech companies under the
United States’ current regulatory landscape).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
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II. FINTECH AND THE UK’S REGULATORY S ANDBOX
A.

What is a Fintech Company?

Fintech encompasses all forms of innovative digital and software
technologies applied directly to the financial services sector. 22 The
fintech moniker embraces almost any company that is using novel
technology to solve existing problems in the financial services
landscape. 23 While “fintech” is a relatively new term, technological
innovation has long been present in the banking and financial services
industry.24 One notable characteristic of fintech companies, as opposed
to banks, is that they utilize disruptive innovation to chip away at the
financial services market share of the banking industry. 25 For example,
peer-to-peer lending fintech companies match providers of funds with
borrowers of funds.26 As a result, these fintech companies utilize
technology to engage in financial intermediation—a financial service
traditionally offered by the banking industry. 27 A few well-known
examples of American fintech companies include Credit Karma, PayPal,
SoFi, Venmo, Coinbase, Lending Club, and Kickstarter. 28
Fintech companies are not only competing with banks as a source
for lending, but have also imbedded themselves into other financialrelated markets.29 Fintech companies like Envestnet now operate in the
personal finance and investment management market to offer consumers
cheaper alternatives to expensive brokers.30 Payment fintechs like PayPal
22. See Kathryn Reed Edge, Fintech: Fad or Future, TBA LAW B LOG (Aug. 1, 2017,
11:00 PM), http://www.tba.org/journal/fintech-fad-or-future (“Loosely defined, a ‘fintech’
company is a firm that uses new technology and innovation with available resources in order
to compete in the marketplace of traditional financial institutions and intermediaries in the
delivery of financial services.”).
23. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3.
24. See History of ATMs and a New Way to Bank, BBVA, https://www.bbva.com/en/
history-atms-new-way-bank/ (last updated June 27, 2017) (indicating that banks have been
innovating since 1967 when Barclays unveiled the first ATM in London).
25. John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory
World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 21 (2016).
26. Id.
27. See id. (“[T]he entry of nonbank competitors using new technologies to capture what
has traditionally been the hallowed turf of the banking industry is an oft-repeated story . . .
.”).
28. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3.
29. See Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3. (laying out the various sectors
of the financial market in which fintech companies operate).
30. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3.
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and Venmo allow merchants and consumers to avoid fees which are
normally associated with credit card transactions. 31 Fintech companies
are also competing with traditional financial institutions in Wall Street
trading, data analytics, national and international currency transfers, and
crowdfunding sectors of the financial market.32 To further explain and
simplify the fintech ecosystem, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (“PwC”)
coined what it calls the “As, Bs, Cs, and Ds” of fintech firms. 33 “As” are
major financial institutions such as Bank of America, Chase, Wells
Fargo, and Allstate.34 “Bs” are large technology companies that have
some operations in the financial services marketplace, such as Apple and
Google. 35 “Cs” are the firms, like MasterCard, that facilitate financial
services transactions by providing infrastructure or technology to other
fintech firms.36 Finally, “Ds” are the disruptors, or the start-ups focused
on a singular innovative technology or business model. 37
Regardless of whether the company is an “A” or a “D,” the key
element central to the business model of all fintech companies is to
benefit consumers through “lower[ing] costs, expand[ing] access to
unserved markets, and [providing] user-friendly interfaces” by disrupting
the traditional financial marketplace. 38 This disruption, however, has also
created problems for both fintech firms and regulators.39 Because fintech
companies are not subject to all of the same regulations and requirements
as a traditional bank, regulatory confusion and concerns over consumer
protection have generated unease amongst politicians and fintech
companies alike as to the future of the United States fintech industry. 40

31. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3.
32. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3.
33. Haskell Garfinkel & Dean Nicolacakis, Q&A: What is Fintech?, PWC 2 (Apr. 2016),

https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/publications/viewpoints/assets/pwc-fsi-whatis-fintech.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Matthew D. Cutts & Brandon C. Román, The Future of Fintech: A Washington
Perspective, 19 FINTECH L. REP. NL 1 (Nov./Dec. 2016) (discussing the benefits of fintech
companies to the financial industry and the regulatory problems faced by both fintech
companies and regulators alike).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Regulatory Sandbox: The First Example

The United Kingdom, the pioneer of the regulatory sandbox, first
introduced the sandbox concept in 2015 through an initiative called
“Project Innovate” by its Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). 41 This
project was aimed at allowing fintech companies to introduce their
innovative products, services, business models, and delivery mechanisms
to the financial market, outside the full set of regulatory constraints
imposed by the FCA.42 By lowering administrative barriers and costs to
both market entrants and established financial institutions, the FCA’s
sandbox sought to provide a safe space for fintech companies to
innovate. 43
In order to accomplish this goal, the FCA developed a flexible
and supervised regulatory sandbox.44 Through the creation of a “sandbox
unit” that is charged with handling sandbox applications and supervising
the testing process by the fintech companies, the FCA is able to make
decisions regarding which regulations to relax for a particular fintech
company on a case-by-case basis.45 Therefore, Project Innovate is not
tailored to a discrete category of fintech firms. 46 Instead, it is aware that
each fintech firm faces unique regulatory challenges and will help each
firm individually during testing in the sandbox.47
Equally as important as the flexibility of Project Innovate is the
FCA’s supervision over the testing process. 48 In order to adequately
protect consumers and the financial system, fintech companies accepted
41. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX 1, 2 (Nov. 2015), https://
www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf [hereinafter FCA REGULATORY
SANDBOX OUTLINE] (outlining the FCA’s plan to implement a regulatory sandbox).
42. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY S ANDBOX, https://www.fca.org.uk/fir
ms/regulatory-sandbox (last updated Dec. 15, 2017) [hereinafter FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX
DISCUSSION] (providing an in-depth discussion on the United Kingdom’s regulatory sandbox).
43. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX O UTLINE, supra note 41, at 2; see DR. PHILIP TRILLMICH
& KATRINA JOKIC, WHITE & CASE, TECHNOLOGY NEWSFLASH: UK ‘REGULATORY SANDBOX’
TO FOSTER FINTECH INNOVATION (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/
alert/uk-regulatory-sandbox-foster-fintech-innovation (discussing the goals and purpose of
the FCA’s regulatory sandbox).
44. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX O UTLINE, supra note 41, at 2.
45. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX O UTLINE, supra note 41, at 3.
46. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (indicating that the
FCA’s sandbox unit will consider applications and monitor the testing process for each firm).
47. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX O UTLINE, supra note 41, at 3.
48. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (considering consumer
safeguards to be among the three key questions when investigating the feasibility of sandbox
implementation).
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into the regulatory sandbox work directly with the FCA and its sandbox
unit throughout the testing process.49 This ensures that a balance is struck
between enforcing regulations essential to consumer protection and
relaxing unnecessary regulations that burden the fintech firm.50
The FCA began accepting applications from fintech companies
in May 2016 for its first sandbox cohort. 51 In order to be eligible for the
sandbox, a fintech company must operate within one of seven sectors of
business within the United Kingdom. 52 These sectors include retail
banking, retail lending, general insurance and pensions, pensions and
retirement income, retail investments, investment management, and
wholesale financial markets.53 Additionally, the fintech company must
satisfy the following criteria to qualify for the FCA’s sandbox
protections: (1) the fintech company must be seeking to deliver
innovation that is regulated in the U.K. financial services market; (2) the
innovation must be ground-breaking or significantly different from those
already in the marketplace; (3) the innovation must benefit consumers
and promote competition; (4) the fintech company must display a genuine
need to test its innovation within the sandbox; and (5) the fintech
company must have a well-developed plan for testing and be prepared to
test the innovation.54
Thus far, the FCA’s sandbox has had great success. 55 The FCA
tested eighteen businesses as part of Project Innovate’s first cohort,
twenty-four more fintech companies have been approved for testing as
49. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (“[The sandbox unit]
will be responsible for considering sandbox applications and monitoring the testing process).
50. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (“We believe that it is
feasible for the FCA to reduce some of the existing regulatory barriers to firms that are testing
new ideas, while also maintaining suitable safeguards.”).
51. See TRILLMICH & JOKIC, supra note 43.
52. See Regulatory Sandbox – Application Form, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.
fca.org.uk/regulatory-sandbox-application-form (last updated June 16, 2017) [hereinafter
FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX APPLICATION FORM] (displaying the criteria for a fintech
company to apply to the FCAs sandbox).
53. Id.
54. See How to Prepare a Sandbox Application, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://
www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/prepare-application (last updated Dec. 15, 2017)
(providing fintech companies with detailed instructions for determining whether they are
eligible to participate in the sandbox).
55. See e.g., STUART DAVIS ET AL., FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX UPDATE : SUCCESSES IN
ROUND ONE, APPLICATION WINDOW FOR ROUND THREE OPEN, LATHAM & WATKINS (June 16,
2017), http://www.latham.london/2017/06/fca-regulatory-sandbox-update-successes-in-ro
und-one-application-window-for-round-three-open/ (indicating that round one of the FCA’s
sandbox was a success and that the FCA intends to continue this success with future cohorts).
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part of the second cohort, and applications for cohort three have already
closed. 56 Looking to the success of the FCA’s sandbox in the United
Kingdom, many other countries around the world have developed similar,
but not identical, sandboxes of their own. 57 For example, Australia,
Bahrain, Canada, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland,
Thailand, and Russia have all implemented some form of a regulatory
sandbox .58
III. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY SANDBOX EFFORTS IN THE
UNITED S TATES
A.

State Efforts at Creating a Regulatory Sandbox

Currently, no state or region in the United States has enacted its
own regulatory sandbox. 59 There is, however, movement in Arizona,
Illinois, and amongst a coalition of the six New England states to create
a state- or regional-level fintech sandbox.60 This state-level movement is
motivated by both state desire to not be viewed as an impediment to
56. Regulatory Sandbox – Cohort 3, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/firms
/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-3 (last updated Aug. 8, 2017); Regulatory Sandbox – Cohort 2,
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-2 (last
updated June 15, 2017); Regulatory Sandbox – Cohort 1, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://
www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-1 (last updated June 15, 2017).
57. Dan Cummings, Regulatory Sandboxes: A Practice For Innovation That Is Trending
Worldwide, ETH NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 8:10 PM), https://www.ethnews.com/regulatorysandboxes-a-practice-for-innovation-that-is-trending-worldwide.
58. See Jessie Willms, New Regulatory Sandbox Could Boost Blockchain Tech in
Canada, NASDAQ (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:12:24 PM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/newregulatory-sandbox-could-boost-blockchain-tech-in-canada-cm757328
(discussing
the
Canadian Security Administrators’ launch of a “Regulatory Sandbox Initiative”); Cummings,
supra note 57 (discussing the trend of implementing a regulatory sandbox that started in the
United Kingdom and spread to other countries across the world); AUSTL. SECURITIES &
INVESTMENT COMMISSION, supra note 9; CENTRAL BANK OF BAHRAIN, REGULATORY
SANDBOX
FRAMEWORK
1
http://www.cbb.gov.bh/assets/Whitepapers/
Regulatory_Sandbox_Framework.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); FinTech Regulatory
Sandbox, MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, http://www.mas.gov.sg/SingaporeFinancial-Centre/Smart-Financial-Centre/FinTech-Regulatory-Sandbox.aspx (last modified
Jan. 9, 2017).
59. Sara Merken, States Embrace Fintech Sandbox Concept as Federal Action Stalls,
BNA (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.bna.com/states-embrace-fintech-n73014464317/
[hereinafter Merken, States Embrace Fintech]; see Brnovich, supra note 18, at 4–5
(discussing the movement of Arizona policymakers toward a regulatory sandbox); see also
Sweeney, supra note 12 (discussing the proposed “New England Regulatory FinTech
Sandbox” in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut).
60. Sweeney, supra note 12.
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innovation and state awareness of the regulatory burdens on fintech
companies to comply with regulatory requirements which may be
applicable in each state.61
Outside the scope of federal regulations and requirements placed
on fintech companies, a fintech company often incurs thousands of
dollars in costs and fees simply through the process of seeking approval
and a license to operate in a state. 62 If the state regulatory burden is scaled
to include compliance and operation in all fifty states, a typical fintech
company can expect millions in expenses and years of frustration in the
pursuit of national expansion.63 Arizona Attorney General Mark
Brnovich has noted that this problem forces start-ups to pursue one of
three routes: (1) the start-up can bear the cost and delays of regulatory
compliance and hope that no other company rolls out a similar innovation
in the interim; 64 (2) the fintech start-up could elect to skip the licensing
process, either due to lack of capital or fear of newcomers, and “hope
they don’t get caught;”65 or (3) the fintech company could decide to close
its doors and move the firm abroad, likely to a place where regulations
are uniform and tailored to facilitate the growth of small start-ups.66
Gradually, states and regions are realizing that the lack of
regulatory uniformity across state lines functions as a barrier to
innovation rather than as a safeguard for consumers. 67 By overburdening
fintech start-ups, the patchwork state regulatory system only serves to
create an additional problem for a company already dealing with the
challenge of raising capital and developing a product. 68 One possible

61. Sweeney, supra note 12.
62. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1 (indicating that compliance costs and legal work

are a significant regulatory barrier for start-up companies).
63. Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1.
64. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1 (“Such delay and expense is unacceptable in an
industry where today’s startup ideas quickly become yesterday’s news . . . .”).
65. Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1.
66. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 2 (“[O]ur global competitors are certainly exploiting
their regulatory advantage to get ahead in fintech.”).
67. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing the movement of Arizona policymakers
toward a regulatory sandbox); see also Sweeney, supra note 12 (discussing the proposed
“New England Regulatory FinTech Sandbox” in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut).
68. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1 (discussing the need for a state-level regulatory
sandbox and the problems faced by fintech firms in today’s regulatory landscape).
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solution to this dilemma would be the creation of a state-level regulatory
sandbox for fintech companies. 69
To this end, David Cotney, the former Massachusetts
Commissioner of Banks, and Cornelius Hurley, director of Boston
University’s Center for Finance, Law, and Policy, have conceptualized
what has come to be known as the “New England Regulatory FinTech
Sandbox” (“NERFS”).70 This proposed sandbox would take the form of
a coalition between Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut.71 While NERFS is still in its infancy, it
has been received with “universal openness” from financial regulators in
all six states.72 NERFS will “stitch[] together elements of [the U.K.
sandbox] . . . and the European Union’s ‘passport’ model for cross-border
banking operations.”73 Essentially, NERFS would bring uniformity to
fintech regulation across the six participating New England states and
allow a fintech company licensed to test within one state to conduct
business in any of the other five states. 74 This practice would be
analogous to the European Union’s (“EU”) passport model which allows
a bank operating in one EU member state to open branches and provide
services, without further authorization, in other EU member states. 75
Therefore, NERFS participants could expect uniform regulatory
standards regardless of which member state or states they choose to
operate out of.76 With the New England states’ regulators on board,
American fintech companies would finally be able to enjoy some of the
same sandbox benefits as their foreign counterparts, at least within
geographical limits of NERFS member states. 77 Furthermore, there is no
indication that a fintech operating within the boundaries of NERFS would
be precluded from seeking licensing to operate within a non-member
69. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing the need for a state-level regulatory
sandbox).
70. Sweeney, supra note 12.
71. Sweeney, supra note 12.
72. Sweeney, supra note 12.
73. Sweeney, supra note 12.
74. Sweeney, supra note 12.
75. Maria J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, Breaking Down Geographic Barriers on Banks: U.S.
and EU Recent Experiences, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA (July 2015), https://
www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1507.
76. See Sweeney, supra note 12 (“In harmonizing the regulatory regime for the sandbox
across state lines . . . the program emulates the EU’s ‘passport.’ [A] bank licensed in one EU
country [is] able to . . . operat[e] seamlessly throughout the [other] states of the EU . . . .”).
77. Sweeney, supra note 12.
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state.78 Therefore, a fintech operating within all NERFS states could also
choose to provide products and services to North Carolina residents,
although the fintech would be without the regulatory harmonies it
experiences within NERFS.79
Contrary to the regional NERFS approach, Arizona and Illinois
have taken steps to implement state-level sandboxes within their
respective geographic boundaries. 80 Arizona was the first state to
announce its own sandbox plans, and draft legislation in the state would
allow fintech companies to test innovations on up to 5,000 consumers
within its sandbox. 81 Attorney General Brnovich states that Arizona’s
sandbox will require certain consumer protection safeguards, but that the
initiative would also reduce regulatory and licensing burdens on
fintechs.82 In Illinois, lawmakers are planning to mirror Arizona’s
sandbox approach and hope to introduce the bill in their next legislative
session.83
State-level sandboxes, whether regional or confined to a singular
state, would unquestionably ease regulatory and licensing burdens on
fintechs.84 Furthermore, state sandboxes could provide these benefits to
fintechs while simultaneously augmenting U.S. competitiveness in the
global fintech marketplace during times of federal gridlock. 85 However,
while there is “real potential value to states serving as true ‘laboratories
of democracy,’” a few major problems still plague state initiatives. 86
First, should Arizona and Illinois cause other states to follow suit and
implement their own sandbox, the purpose of a sandbox—to decrease
regulatory burdens and ambiguity—could be defeated by each state

78. See Sweeney, supra note 12 (indicating that the regulatory regime is only harmonized
among the NERFS states, and making no indication that a NERFS fintech could not also seek
licensing with non-member states).
79. Sweeney, supra note 12.
80. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59.
81. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59.
82. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59.
83. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59.
84. Brnovich, supra note 18, at 3.
85. Brnovich, supra note 18, at 3.
86. See Brian Knight, How the CFPB Could Help State Regulatory Sandboxes, MEDIUM
(July 5, 2017), https://finregrag.com/how-the-cfpb-could-help-state-regulatory-sandboxesd299c2e95ca5 [hereinafter Knight, CFPB Helps State Regulatory Sandboxes] (analyzing
some of the problems associated with a state-level regulatory sandbox and the possible
solutions necessary to ensure an effective state sandbox).
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enacting a sandbox with distinct rules and procedures. 87 This issue
indicates that regional sandboxes, like NERFS, would at least reduce this
concern by providing fintechs with uniform standards across multiple
borders.88 Second, applicable to regional and state-specific sandboxes
alike, federal regulators from agencies such as the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (“CFPB”) would still maintain the authority to
enforce a federal regulation upon a fintech company operating within a
state sandbox. 89 Absent promulgation of a rule by these federal regulators
exempting, for example, NERFS participating fintech companies from
certain conduct, it seems unlikely that any fintech company would “bet
the business” on federal non-enforcement.90 Therefore, until the day the
federal government backs a state-led sandbox initiative with consistent
regulation and possible exemptions, it would seem prudent to strive for a
federal fintech sandbox.91
B.

A Federal Attempt: The Financial Services Innovation Act of
201692

In 2016, Congressman Patrick McHenry of North Carolina
introduced H.R. 6118, the “Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016”
(“FSIA”), to the House of Representatives, which would have created a
federal regulatory sandbox. 93 Development on the FSIA, however, has
been stagnant since October 2016, likely due to both the OCC’s strong
opposition to a federal sandbox and the OCC’s emerging Fintech Charter
program.94 Former Comptroller of the Currency, Thomas Curry, stated
unequivocally that the OCC does not support the sandbox approach
because (1) the agency itself does not have the authority to waive
compliance with regulations; (2) it “never makes sense” to waive

87. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59.
88. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59.
89. See Knight, CFPB Helps State Regulatory Sandboxes, supra note 86 (analyzing some

of the problems associated with a state-level regulatory sandbox).
90. Knight, CFPB Helps State Regulatory Sandboxes, supra note 86.
91. See Knight, CFPB Helps State Regulatory Sandboxes, supra note 86 (laying out the
benefits and drawbacks of a state-level fintech sandbox).
92. The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong. (2016).
93. Id.
94. Id.; see Lalita Clozel, OCC’s Curry Rules Out ‘Safe Space’ for Fintech Companies,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 3, 2016, at 1–2 [hereinafter Clozel, OCC’s Curry] (discussing the OCC’s
opposition to a regulatory sandbox and preference for a Fintech Charter).
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compliance with consumer protection or safety and soundness; and (3)
ensuring the soundness and safety of financial products before rolling
them out is the responsibility of the fintech. 95 The FSIA, however,
remains an important milestone, because a similar sandbox bill could
certainly be re-introduced at a later date.96 This day could come sooner
rather than later, as Congressman McHenry has unequivocally stated that
he intends to promptly re-introduce the FSIA to Congress. 97
Under the FSIA, the United States’ regulatory sandbox initiative
would have incorporated a two-pronged approach.98 First, the FSIA
would create a government-wide “fintech oversight regime.” 99 In order
to implement this regime, the FSIA would have required each of the
following federal agencies to establish their own Financial Services
Innovation Office (“FSIO”): (1) the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; (2) the CFPB; (3) the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”); (4) the Department of Housing and Urban
Development; (5) the Department of the Treasury; (6) the Farm Credit
Administration; (7) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (8) the
Federal Housing Finance Agency; (9) the Federal Trade Commission;
(10) the National Credit Union Administration Board; (11) the OCC; and
(12) the Securities and Exchange Commission. 100 Initially, the FSIA
requires each of these agencies to identify areas of regulation applicable
to financial innovation that they would consider modifying or waiving
under the sandbox, and to utilize the newly created FSIOs to “promote
financial innovations” through such a waiver or modification. 101
Furthermore, each agency’s FSIO director and one state banking
supervisor would comprise the FSIO Liaison Committee, a body tasked
95. Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94.
96. See Susan Gault-Brown & John Sullivan, Foreign Regulators Easing Regulatory

Burdens on Fintech Companies – Will the U.S. Follow Suit?, WSGR FINTECH UPDATE (May
2017), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/fintech-update/May2017/index.htm
(analyzing the FSIA and the status of a regulatory sandbox in the United States).
97. Sara Merken, Fintech Firms May Receive More No-Action Letters from CFPB,
[2017] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 186, at 2 (Sept. 27, 2017).
98. See H.R. 6118 §§ 2–6 (discussing the establishment of FSIOs at federal agencies and
the ability of a covered person to petition the federal agencies for an enforceable compliance
agreement).
99. See C. Todd Gibson & Tyler Kirk, Financial Services Innovation Act: The U.S. Wants
a Sandbox Too, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
financial-services-innovation-act-us-wants-sandbox-too (laying out the framework of the
FSIA and the two-pronged approach employed by the FSIA).
100. H.R. 6118 § 2(2).
101. Id. § 3.
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with facilitating the cooperation of each FSIO.102 Thus, the FSIOs and
the FSIO Liaison Committee comprise the oversight regime prong. 103
The second prong of the FSIA establishes the sandbox itself,
allowing a “covered person” (a fintech firm “that offers or intends to offer
a financial innovation”) to petition one or more FSIOs for an “alternative
compliance plan under an ‘enforceable compliance agreement.’” 104 In
submitting a petition for an alternative compliance plan, a fintech firm
must first delineate the regulatory waivers or modifications sought, and
subsequently demonstrate that the firm’s proposed financial innovation
would satisfy the following conditions: (1) serve the public interest; (2)
improve access to financial products or services; (3) present no systemic
risk to the United States financial system; and (4) promote consumer
protection. 105
Upon submitting a petition to one or more FSIO agencies, a
covered person automatically triggers the safe harbor provision of FSIA
for the duration of the period between the petition submittal and the
agency decision on the petition. 106 Under this provision, a fintech
company is protected from agency enforcement action “relating to the
financial innovation that was the subject of the petition.” 107 In order to
balance out this added layer of protection for fintech companies, the FSIA
also authorized federal agencies to seek injunctive relief upon a
determination that the fintech innovation in question poses a threat to
consumers or presents a systemic risk to the financial system. 108
Once a petition is approved by the relevant FSIO and the parties
agree to the enforceable compliance agreement’s terms and conditions,
the fintech company and its potential innovation are officially operating
within the sandbox. 109 At this stage, the fintech company enjoys the
modifications or waivers granted by the compliance agreement, as well
as a limitation on enforcement actions brought by other federal or state

102. Id. § 5.
103. See id. §§ 2–6 (discussing the creation of FSIOs and the FSIO Liaison Committee).
104. See id. §§ 2, 6 (defining “covered person” and allowing a covered person to petition

the relevant agency for an enforceable compliance agreement); see also Gibson & Kirk, supra
note 99 (laying out the framework of the FSIA and its two-pronged approach).
105. Id. § 6(b).
106. Id. § 6(d).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 6(d)(2).
109. Id. § 8.
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agencies. 110 Only in the case of a judicial determination that the FSIO’s
approval of the fintech innovation was arbitrary, capricious, and caused
substantial harm to consumers can a state commence an enforcement
action against a fintech firm operating within the sandbox. 111 Therefore,
the FSIA provides fintech firms with increased safety from federal or
state enforcement actions while simultaneously reserving some
enforcement power to the state in which the fintech firm is operating. 112
All in all, the FSIA would have created a federal oversight regime
comprised of twelve FSIOs and a FSIO Liaison Committee to supervise
the operation of the proposed regulatory sandbox. 113 In order to provide
a safe space for innovation, the FSIA also incorporated appropriate
safeguards for consumers, the financial system, and fintech firms
operating within the sandbox.114 The FSIA, however, is stagnant in
Congress and merely serves as an example of what a federal regulatory
sandbox might look like in the future. 115
C.

Comparing the FSIA to the FCA’s Project Innovate

Not all sandboxes are created equal. The unique financial system
of each nation or country will necessitate the development of a sandbox
tailored to its specific needs.116 While the main goal of a sandbox—
allowing fintech companies to “test innovative products, services,
business models and delivery mechanisms in the real market, with real
consumers[,]”117 without fear of certain regulatory consequences—might

110. See id. § 8(d)(1)(B) (“a State may not commence an enforcement action against the
covered person . . . if the covered person provides the State with the enforcement compliance
agreement and a statement of the policies and procedures the covered person has in place to
comply with State laws . . . .”).
111. Id. § 8(d)(2).
112. See id. §§ 2–8 (providing information on The Financial Services Innovation Act of
2016, which would create a federal regulatory sandbox in the United States).
113. Id. § 2(2), (6).
114. See id. §§ 2–6 (comprising the oversight regime prong by establishing FSIOs at
twelve federal agencies which receive petitions from fintechs).
115. See Gault-Brown & Sullivan, supra note 96 (“Although the proposed bill died in
committee, a similar bill could be re-introduced in the current or future Congress.”).
116. See Patrick McHenry, CFPB’s ‘Project Catalyst’ Failed. Fintech Deserves Better,
AM. BANKER, Apr. 25, 2017, at 3 (“While it is true that the American financial system—and
therefore our financial regulators—are different than other countries, that does not mean we
cannot put forward policies that allow for more regulatory flexibility.”).
117. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 1; see H.R. 6118 § 4(a)
(establishing FSIOs to “promote financial innovations.”).
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ring true across all sandbox models, the tools and framework used to
accomplish this goal certainly differ. 118
Common to both the FSIA and the FCA’s sandbox is the
emphasis placed on consumer benefit and safety, flexibility, and
supervision. 119 Regulatory flexibility allows fintech firms in either
sandbox to seek agency guidance, petition for regulatory modifications
or waivers, and relinquish the threat of enforcement actions for the
duration of the sandbox test.120 To counteract the flexibility of reduced
regulation, fintech companies operating within either sandbox are closely
supervised by their respective regulatory agencies—the FSIOs of the
FSIA and the FCA’s sandbox units—to ensure safety to consumers and
the respective nations’ financial system. 121
The frameworks of the FSIA and the FCA’s sandbox differ,
however, primarily due to the distinct regulatory environment in which
they operate. 122 For example, the U.K. financial system is comprised of
only five regulatory agencies, while the U.S. financial system
incorporates twelve federal regulators working alongside myriad state
bank, insurance, and securities regulators. 123 While the FCA’s sandbox
indicates that it is the only agency in the United Kingdom that could take
enforcement action against a fintech company, fintech firms in the United
States must worry about both federal and state agency enforcement
actions. 124 Therefore, the FSIA framework explicitly sought to protect
fintech firms from enforcement actions on the state and federal level, a
118. Compare H.R. 6118 §§ 2–6, with FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX O UTLINE, supra note
41, at 1.
119. H.R. 6118 § 6(b); FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3.
120. H.R. 6118 §§ 6, 8; FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3.
121. See H.R. 6118 §§ 2–6 (comprising the FSIA’s oversight regime); see also FCA
REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (outlining the FCA’s plan to implement
a regulatory sandbox, which includes the FCA’s oversight regime comprised of “sandbox
units”).
122. Compare H.R. 6118 § 2(2) (listing the U.S. financial regulators), with UK
Regulators, Government and Other Bodies, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (“FCA”), https://
www.fca.org.uk/about/uk-regulators-government-other-bodies (last updated Jan. 9, 2017)
(listing the United Kingdom’s financial regulators).
123. See H.R. 6118 § 2(2) (listing the U.S. financial regulators); see also UK Regulators,
Government and Other Bodies, supra note 122 (listing the FCA, the Prudential Regulation
Authority, the Bank of England, the Financial Policy Committee, and The Treasury as the
United Kingdom’s financial regulators).
124. See H.R. 6118 § 8(d) (indicating that federal agencies and states could seek
enforcement actions against a fintech firm); see also FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE,
supra note 41, at 9 (indicating that the FCA would be the authority bringing enforcement
actions in its capacity as the singular financial regulator in the U.K.).
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problem not encountered by the FCA. 125 Furthermore, there is no
indication that the FCA’s sandbox includes a safe harbor provision
similar to that of the FSIA, which provides a free pass to fintechs awaiting
agency decision post-petition submittal.126
As compared to the FCA’s sandbox, the FSIA is truly unique in
that it “gives the benefit of the doubt to fintech companies and places the
onus on federal regulators to come up with credible reasons for why a
waiver or modification should not be granted.” 127 According to the FSIA,
an agency is required to approve a fintech firm’s petition to enter into the
sandbox so long as the firm “shows that it is more likely than not that [it]
meets the requirements for establishing an alternative compliance
plan.”128 Should an agency reject a fintech company’s petition under the
FSIA, however, the agency is then required to explain the reason for
disapproval and identify “persons likely to benefit[] from rejecting the
petition.”129 The objective of this identification requirement is both
transparency and promotion of fair competition in the marketplace. 130
Utilizing PwC’s “As, Bs, Cs, and Ds” of fintech, imagine a scenario in
which an “A” (a large, well-established financial institution) stands to
lose part of its overall financial services market share if a “D” (a disruptor
or fast moving start-up fintech firm) were permitted to bring its
innovation to market through the FSIA. 131 By requiring the FSIO to
disclose the “A” that stands to benefit from the “D’s” absence in the
sandbox, the FSIA makes a good faith effort to require regulators to be

125. See H.R. 6118 § 8(d)(2) (indicating that “a State may [only] commence an
enforcement action against a covered person . . . if . . . [a] court determines the agency’s action
was arbitrary and capricious and the financial innovation has substantially harmed consumers
within such State.”).
126. See id. § 6(d)(1) (“During the period after a covered person submits a petition under
this section and before the agency receiving the petition makes a determination on the petition
. . . an agency may not take an enforcement action against a covered person relating to the
financial innovation that was the subject of the petition.”).
127. Lee Reiners, New Legislation Designed to Make the U.S. a Fintech Leader, THE
FINREG BLOG (Nov. 17, 2016), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2016/11/17/newlegislation-designed-to-make-the-u-s-a-fintech-leader/.
128. H.R. 6118 § 7(b).
129. Id. § 7(c).
130. See Reiners, supra note 127 (“By publicly identifying incumbent firms that benefit
from a banking agency rejecting a fintech company’s petition, it brings transparency to the
process and ensures that regulation does more than simply protect firms already under the
regulatory umbrella.”).
131. Garfinkel & Nicolacakis, supra note 33.
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transparent and impartial to the “As, Bs, Cs, and Ds” of the fintech
ecosystem. 132
D.

Keeping up with the Joneses: The United States Needs a
Sandbox Too

Under the current federal regulatory environment, fintech
companies are faced with a multitude of questions and very few
answers.133 Which agencies govern the fintech’s innovation? 134 Which
rules and regulations are applicable to the innovation?135 Do the premobile and pre-Internet regulations and rules apply to the fintech firm?136
How can a small start-up maintain compliance in the ever-changing
regulatory ecosystem? 137 Likewise, regulators are faced with novel
questions of their own. 138 How do rules and regulations apply to the
modern fintech firm business model?139 How can regulators “get their
arms more firmly around” the fintech sector to stop regulatory arbitrage,
while also promoting innovation? 140
The regulatory response to these questions has yet to provide
clarity on the matter.141 Citing consumer protection concerns, the OCC
has “soundly rejected the possibility of creating a [regulatory sandbox]”
in the United States. 142 Instead, regulators are looking for other, nonsandbox avenues to promote innovation and competition in the United
132. See H.R. 6118 § 7 (requiring transparency after disapproval of a fintech’s petition by
the relevant regulator); Garfinkel & Nicolacakis, supra note 33.
133. See Elliott, supra note 13 (summarizing the regulatory questions and concerns facing
fintechs).
134. Elliott, supra note 13.
135. Elliott, supra note 13.
136. Elliott, supra note 13.
137. Elliott, supra note 13.
138. See Brian Knight, Innovation Will Stall Without a Regulatory Fintech ‘Sandbox,’ AM.
BANKER, Nov. 15, 2016, at 1–3 [hereinafter Knight, Innovation Will Stall] (indicating that
financial regulators, like the OCC, are unsure of the impact a sandbox might have on
consumer safety).
139. See Elliott, supra note 13 (“[I]t’s not always clear specifically which rules and regs
[a fintech has] to be in compliance with.”).
140. Elliott, supra note 13.
141. See Elliott, supra note 13 (“[T]here has been an obvious groundswell by the
regulatory agencies that they need to get a deeper understanding of the proliferation of new
financial services models that simply didn’t exist four or five years ago.”).
142. See Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94 (“Thomas Curry . . . soundly rejected the
possibility of creating a ‘safe space’ for fintech firms to operate outside of consumer
protection rules while they develop and test new products.”).
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States.143 For example, the CFTC announced an innovation lab, called
“LabCFTC,” which serves as a point of contact for “fintech innovators to
engage with the CFTC [and] learn about the CFTC’s regulatory
framework . . . .”144
The CFPB also launched “Project Catalyst,” which allows
innovators to request no-action letters from the CFPB.145 While acquiring
a no-action letter would allow a fintech firm to take a product to market
without fear of enforcement by the CFPB, relatively little success has
been realized through Project Catalyst, likely because the no-action
letters are “subject to modification or revocation at any time at the
discretion of the [CFPB].”146 Since Project Catalyst’s inception in 2012,
the CFPB has only issued one no-action letter, which was granted in
September 2017 to “Upstart,” a fintech company that uses artificial
intelligence to make credit and loan pricing decisions. 147 This no-action
letter, which lasts for three years, states that the CFPB has no “present
intention” to recommend any supervisory or enforcement action,
pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, against Upstart with
regards to one of the fintech’s products. 148 Furthermore, the no-action
letter also states that it is not binding upon the CFPB, and that the CFPB
may initiate a retroactive enforcement or supervisory action against
Upstart if appropriate.149 Therefore, it would seem that the CFPB’s noaction letters operate as more of a revocable promise than a safe harbor
for innovators.150 Accordingly, Upstart could have the rug pulled out
from under its feet at any time and for any reason deemed appropriate by
the CFPB.
143. See Forshee, supra note 10 (introducing the CFTC’s LabCFTC and stating that “many
. . . are skeptical that a sandbox will [ever] happen in the U.S. . . . .”).
144. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, LABCFTC OVERVIEW, http://
www.cftc.gov/LabCFTC/Overview/index.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
145. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, POLICY ON N O-ACTION LETTERS; INFORMATION
COLLECTION 25 n.7 (Feb. 18, 2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_noaction-letter-policy.pdf.
146. Id. at 33; see McHenry, supra note 116 (describing the failed attempt by the CFPB at
creating attractive no-action letters).
147. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU; UPSTART NO-ACTION LETTER (Sept. 14, 2017), http:/
/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter.pdf; Merken,
supra note 97.
148. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 147.
149. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 147.
150. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 147 (stating the various exceptions of the
no-action letter that leave fulfilment of the CFPB’s “present intentions” up to the agency’s
discretion).
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Not without controversy, the OCC has proposed to foster
innovation and reduce ambiguities through its Fintech Charter
initiative. 151 This special purpose charter aims to place an accepted
fintech company under the same rules and regulations as national
banks. 152 Aside from the question of whether the OCC even has the
authority to create a Fintech Charter, it is unclear that a special purpose
charter for fintechs would provide regulatory relief to all but the most
experienced and capital-flush fintech firms. 153 While the “As” and “Bs”
of the fintech ecosystem could certainly pass the OCC’s adequate capital
and experienced management criteria, it is unlikely that a newly formed
start-up could do the same. 154 Therefore, it appears that the OCC’s
Fintech Charter favors larger innovators while presenting a fruitless
opportunity to smaller firms. 155
The OCC has also proposed the implementation of a bank-run
“pilot” program to foster innovation and support fintech companies. 156
The OCC equates its pilot program with a regulatory sandbox, because
the program would require regulators to create a safe space for innovation
for the pilot program’s participants. 157 This safe space, however, would
provide absolutely no benefit to the vast majority of fintech firms,
because “[e]ligible participants for the program . . . include OCCsupervised banks and significant service providers, [and] fintechs in

151. See Edge, supra note 22 (discussing the lawsuit filed by the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors in opposition of the OCC’s Fintech Charter).
152. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER ’S LICENSING
MANUAL: CHARTERS 50 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/
licensing-manuals/charters.pdf [hereinafter Comptroller’s Licensing Manual].
153. See Roberts, supra note 17 (arguing that the OCC’s Fintech Charter would only
benefit the largest fintechs and would not affect the business operations of smaller fintechs);
see also Press Release, Jim Kurtze, Vice President of Communications, Conference of State
Bank Supervisors, Statement by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors on Comptroller’s
Announcement of New Federal Charters (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.csbs.org/news/pressreleases/pr2016/Pages/120216.aspx (arguing that the OCC lacks the power to establish fullservice bank charters to institutions that do not engage in deposit taking without Congress’
approval).
154. Comptroller’s Licensing Manual, supra note 152; see e.g., Roberts, supra note 17
(indicating that the OCC’s Fintech Charter would only benefit the largest fintech companies).
155. Roberts, supra note 17.
156. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
FOR IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK 12 (2016), https://www.
occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/recommendations-decisions-forimplementing-a-responsible-innovation-framework.pdf [hereinafter OCC, IMPLEMENTING A
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK].
157. Id.
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partnership with an OCC-supervised bank or significant service provider
. . . .”158 While an independent fintech firm could not meet the pilot
program’s criteria for entry, PayPal, for example, would be eligible for
the OCC’s pilot program due to its partnership with Bank of America, an
OCC-supervised bank.159 This eligibility requirement creates a catch-22
situation for fintech firms, because the firm would be forced to choose
between gaining the benefits of the sandbox by partnering with the
competition—assuming that the fintech firm even has a partnership
offer—or forego its benefits in favor of maintaining its separate existence
and ability to compete directly with all OCC-regulated institutions.160
Therefore, when compared to the FCA’s sandbox in the United Kingdom,
the OCC’s pilot program is not a true fintech regulatory sandbox. 161
Based on the current impact of the pseudo-sandbox initiatives by
the OCC, CFPB, and CFTC, the only viable option to promote innovation
for fintech companies of all sizes would be a true regulatory sandbox. 162
Aside from logistical problems, consumer protection concerns appear to
be the major federal and state concern about implementing a true
regulatory sandbox. 163 In a speech in London, former Comptroller of the
Currency, Thomas Curry,164 said “[w]aiving compliance with consumer

158. Id.
159. See Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America and PayPal Partner to Enable

In-Store
Payments
and
Account
Linking
(July
26,
2017),
http://
newsroom.bankofamerica.com/press-releases/consumer-banking/bank-america-and-paypalpartner-enable-store-payments-and-account-li (announcing the partnership between Bank of
America and PayPal).
160. See OCC, IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 156,
at 8 (requiring pilot participating fintechs to partner with an OCC-supervised bank).
161. See OCC, IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 156,
at 11–12 (requiring a fintech to partner with a bank); see also FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX
OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 1–20 (lacking a bank partnership requirement).
162. See Brnovich, supra note 18 (discussing the challenges to fintech companies under
the United States’ current regulatory landscape and stating that a sandbox would “maintain
our country’s competitiveness in the global marketplace.”).
163. See Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94 (indicating that the OCC’s opposition to
sandbox implementation centers around consumer protection concerns).
164. Joseph Otting was confirmed as Curry’s replacement on November 16, 2017. Otting
has yet to opine on the OCC’s proposed fintech charter or the regulatory sandbox concept.
Otting Confirmed as Comptroller of the Currency, ABA BANKING J. (Nov. 16, 2017), https:/
/bankingjournal.aba.com/2017/11/otting-confirmed-as-comptroller-of-the-currency/;
MATTHEW CUTTS ET AL., THE LATEST ON FINTECH: FEDERAL AND BEYOND, SQUIRE PATTON
BOGGS (2017), https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/201
7/06/the-latest-on-fintech-federal-and-beyond/27235public-policy-financial-servicesthelatest-on-fintech—federal-and-beyondthought-leadership.pdf.
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protection or safety . . . never makes sense . . . .”165 Due to his remarks,
it would seem that Mr. Curry views a regulatory sandbox as the beginning
of a “race to the bottom”—when a nation or region lessens regulation or
oversight to attract investment during a state of cutthroat competition. 166
While a regulatory sandbox would likely attract venture capital
investment in the U.S. economy, this does not necessitate that a “race to
the bottom” would also occur.167 If the FCA’s sandbox is any indication,
a properly tailored sandbox can “offer an environment where companies
can innovate while ensuring consumers are protected.” 168 This scenario
seems like a win-win or a race to the top, not to the bottom. 169
IV. A REGULATORY SANDBOX FOR THE UNITED STATES
The FSIA is a great example of how the United States could solve
some of the regulatory problems affecting fintech firms, while also
protecting consumers.170 Regulatory ambiguity would be quashed by the
transparency and supervision required under the FSIA. 171 Regulatory
clarity and supervision would, in turn, reduce the often daunting upfront
compliance costs incurred by disruptive fintechs who are forced to
speculate as to the applicability of existing regulations to their specific
business model.172 This problem is solved by continuous dialogue
between the fintech company and its regulators within the sandbox,

165. Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94.
166. Race to the Bottom, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/race-

bottom.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
167. See Thomas J. Curry, Georgetown Law Remarks, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that
investment in fintech companies has grown to over $24 billion worldwide); see also Sam
Pearse, How the FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox scheme could help UK FinTech Startups, UK
TECH NEWS (May 2, 2016), https://www.uktech.news/news/how-the-fcas-regulatorysandbox-scheme-could-help-uk-fintech-startups-20160502 (arguing that a regulatory
sandbox attracts investment through lessening regulatory ambiguity while, at the same time,
enabling the U.K. to evolve its regulatory environment to better understand how to regulate
similar fintechs in the future).
168. See Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (promoting the regulatory sandbox
and explaining the regulatory disfavor of a fintech sandbox).
169. Pearse, supra note 167 (arguing that a regulatory sandbox attracts investment through
lessening regulatory ambiguity while, at the same time, enabling the U.K. to evolve its
regulatory environment to better understand how to regulate similar fintechs in the future).
170. The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong. (2016).
171. See id. § 6 (requiring transparency by regulators who disapprove of a fintech’s
petition for an enforceable compliance agreement).
172. See Pearse, supra note 167 (indicating that engaging in a direct dialogue with a
regulator would relieve startups of some upfront costs).
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which also allows the regulators to remain flexible, adapt, and learn how
to better regulate novel business models within the financial
marketplace. 173 In this regard, the sandbox is mutually beneficial to
innovators and regulators alike.
Additionally, under the protections of a regulatory sandbox,
fintech companies would be exempt from state or federal enforcement
actions relating to their innovations, thereby increasing investor
confidence and attracting capital contributions to the innovation. 174
Investors are not the only market participants whose confidence is
increased by the presence of a sandbox, however. 175 Fintechs also see a
rise in the confidence of their customers due to the sandbox, because the
sandbox supervision and regulation is an important hook to sell their
products in the market.176
Furthermore, there is no indication that consumers would be any
less protected under a regulatory sandbox. 177 The FSIA, for example,
could be expanded to require regulators to limit a fintech company’s
liability for inadvertent consumer protection violations to merely
compensating the public for the harm it caused. 178 In this manner, fintech
companies would be exempt from federal fines or penalties, while still
being required to re-pay harmed consumers.179
“Of the three
justifications for sanctioning a company—compensation, punishment[,]
and deterrence—only the first is appropriate for companies operating
173. See Pearse, supra note 167 (pointing out that the FCA’s early involvement and direct
dialogue with fintechs and their innovations will position the regulator in a better place to
“advise the [U.K.] on the changes necessary to evolve the [country’s] regulatory
environment.”).
174. H.R. 6118 § 8; see DELOITTE, REGULATORY SANDBOX MAKING INDIA A GLOBAL
FINTECH HUB 26 (July 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documen
ts/technology-media-telecommunications/in-tmt-fintech-regulatory-sandbox-web.pdf
(indicating that a fintech sandbox increases investor confidence).
175. See I participated in a ‘Regulatory Sandbox’, BBVA (June 14, 2017), https://www.b
bva.com/en/participated-regulatory-sandbox/ (interviewing a participant in the FCA’s
sandbox and learning that the fintech’s regulation was an important hook to sell its products
to customers).
176. See id. (“[R]egulation is an important hook to sell our products. There’s no need to
be afraid of the regulator.”).
177. See Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (indicating that fintech companies
operating in a sandbox would still be responsible for remuneration to harmed consumers).
178. See Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (“[A] U.S. sandbox could help
encourage innovation without jeopardizing consumers. In exchange for greater transparency
from the company, regulators could agree to limit the company’s potential liability for future
consumer protection violations.”).
179. Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138.
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with transparency and good faith.” 180 Contrary to the position of the
OCC, a regulatory sandbox is compatible with consumer protection. 181
A federal regulatory sandbox would also provide the same
consumers it protects with ample benefits.182 Consumers would “be able
to enjoy the fruits of innovation” created and augmented by the fintech
sandbox, through increasing the sheer number of innovative products
reaching the marketplace.183 Such fruits could also translate into lower
costs for consumers and financial inclusion for the unserved and
underserved consumers in emerging markets and developing
economies.184 Additionally, fintech companies could see increased
access to financial investment and higher company valuations due to
decreased regulatory uncertainty. 185
Therefore, in order for the United States to both foster innovation
and remain globally attractive to fintech firms and investors,
implementing a sandbox in the near future is a necessity, not an option. 186
The FSIA was a great example of what an American regulatory sandbox
could contribute to fintech innovators. 187 Using the FSIA as a model,
regulators and politicians should sit down and reconsider the need for a
regulatory sandbox—before we start losing players to a more attractive
team.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138.
Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138.
Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138.
Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138.
See Ivo Jenik, Regulatory Sandboxes: Potential for Financial Inclusion?, CGAP
(Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.cgap.org/blog/regulatory-sandboxes-potential-financialinclusion (discussing the potential utility of a regulatory sandbox for the unserved and
underserved markets).
185. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 5 (indicating that
implementation of a regulatory sandbox would provide fintechs with better access to
financing such as equity funding).
186. See Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (promoting the regulatory sandbox
and explaining the sandbox’s compatibility with consumer protection); see also Brnovich,
supra note 18 (discussing the challenges to fintech companies under the United States’ current
regulatory landscape and stating that a sandbox would “maintain our country’s
competitiveness in the global marketplace.”).
187. The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong. (2016).
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V. CONCLUSION
Regulatory sandboxes, if properly developed, benefit fintech
companies and consumers alike by encouraging innovation. 188 Countries
and nations all over the world are following the United Kingdom’s lead
and have established, or plan on establishing, their own regulatory
sandboxes.189 Other than the possible reintroduction of the FSIA to
Congress and a few state-led sandbox discussions, the United States
seemingly does not intend to follow suit. 190 Based upon misconceptions
and preconceived notions regarding the dangers of sandbox
implementation, the OCC and other federal regulators have all but turned
their back on the concept.191 Therefore, in order to stay competitive in
the global fintech landscape, it is time for Congress to reconsider
implementing a federal sandbox with legislation similar to the FSIA. 192
LUKE G. THOMAS*

188. See Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (“[S]andboxes need not be a
Hobbesian ‘war of all against all,’ where the powerful prey on the weak. Instead—provided
they are done right—sandboxes can offer an environment where companies can innovate
while ensuring consumers are protected.”).
189. See Cummings, supra note 57 (discussing the potential utility of a regulatory sandbox
and the many nations that are following the lead of the United Kingdom).
190. See Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94 (providing former Comptroller of the
Currency Thomas Curry’s view that a U.S. sandbox doesn’t “make sense” and surpasses the
current authority of the OCC to implement).
191. Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94; see Michael J. Bologna, Fed Official Dismisses
‘Regulatory Sandboxes’ for Fintech, BNA (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.bna.com/fedofficial-dismisses-n57982088022/ (“I don’t see that sandboxes are likely going to be
something that we in the United States are going to be using much in the near future.”); see
also Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (promoting the regulatory sandbox and
explaining the regulatory disfavor of a fintech sandbox).
192. See Exec. Order No. 13772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,965 (Feb. 8, 2017) (stating that part of
the Trump administration’s financial regulatory policy includes “enabl[ing] American
companies to be competitive with foreign firms in domestic and foreign markets”).
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